Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit crisis. Show all posts

Mar 20, 2009

Detoxification

Early next week, the Obama Administration will roll out its plan to buy up those nasty mortgage-backed securities blamed for bringing the credit markets to a grinding halt. Apparently, the Treasury Department will push for public-private partnerships to sop up the toxic soup. From the New York Times:
The Treasury Department is expected to unveil early next week its long-delayed plan to buy as much as $1 trillion in troubled mortgages and related assets from financial institutions, according to people close to the talks.

The plan is likely to offer generous subsidies, in the form of low-interest loans, to coax investors to form partnerships with the government to buy toxic assets from banks.
Wall Street Journal

*Updated March 21, 9:49 a.m.: Paul Krugman digs into the details and finds the plan seriously wanting:
And I fear that when the plan fails, as it almost surely will, the administration will have shot its bolt: it won’t be able to come back to Congress for a plan that might actually work.

What an awful mess.

Feb 22, 2009

Another real-estate bubble about to burst

Nobody does a boom-and-bust cycle like America, but the Chinese are trying their best to catch up.

A pre-Olympic building boom has left Beijing has millions of square feet of expensive office space no one wants to lease, fancy stadiums no on wants to play in, and masses of high-end homes and apartments that no one can afford. The iconic Bird's Nest stadium is slated to become a mall.

Real estate prices are tumbling. Banks, however, have yet to begin writing down the loans.

Sound familiar?

From the Los Angeles Times:
The Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics reported this month that housing sales in the city dropped 40% last year. Chinese economists have predicted that housing prices will drop 15% to 20% in Beijing this year. Shanghai has experienced a similar decline.

"You can look at this perhaps as a healthy correction in the market," [Louis Kuijs, a senior economist at the World Bank in Beijing, said].

In the longer term, he said, "China's urbanization and overall development is going to lead to a very large additional demand for housing in the city."

Before that happens, the situation could get worse. Most of the real estate has been financed by Chinese banks, which have avoided writing down the loans. Eventually, they will be forced to, and that probably will have a ripple effect throughout the economy.
That ripple will almost certainly cross the Pacific and hit American banks that have come to rely on the Chinese for infusions of new capital.

Feb 10, 2009

TARP indigestion

Some banks have had a hard time with their taxpayer chemotherapy treatments and say they want to stop. From the New York Times:
Wall Street banks have taken billions of taxpayer dollars. Now some of them are starting to wonder if they should give the money back.

Even before the government announced its latest efforts to fix the troubled banking industry on Tuesday, executives at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley said they wanted to repay the money quickly. Both banks received $10 billion under the first rescue plan last fall.

-snip-

“We just think that operating our business without the government capital would be an easier thing to do,” said David A. Viniar, the chief financial officer of Goldman. “We’d be under less scrutiny, and under less pressure. Not that we’d be out of the public eye; we’re still going to be in the public eye.”
It's good they're feeling so healthy again, right?

Also, shouldn't we take some comfort in the fact that the Dow dropped today after Treasurer Timothy Geithner laid out TARP II? Like, maybe stockholders are coming to grips with the reality that the government can't make their broken eggs whole again.

Jan 26, 2009

Fixing a hole before it forms

Former Washington Post editor Marsha Hamilton offers an instructive analysis of the news media's failure to adequately signal the severity of the coming economic crisis (it's certainly more informative than the hyperventilation found here).

Hamilton writes:

But even in hindsight, I think it would have taken a miracle for business journalists to have foreseen the current crisis in its magnitude and depth. Beat reporters saw the pieces of it, and columnists who took a broader view warned about the buildup of risk. But even those who predicted disaster, I think it’s fair to say, didn’t know how widespread it would become or how unprecedented the government’s reaction would be...

Nonetheless, there are certainly lessons to be learned about how to change some structural and cultural biases that might have gotten in the way—including the segregated silos we sometimes fall into in our beats, and a bias against speculative “this trend could be dangerous” stories. It’s not as sexy to prevent disasters as it is to cover them, but maybe we should rethink that, and learn to view warnings and prevention as one of the most important parts of our jobs.

One of the biggest obstacles to understanding, however, was out of our control: it was the decision to let major financial markets full of new types of housing-related investments expand with little or no federal oversight. No regulation means no transparency. Reporters and investors alike were kept from seeing what was going on behind the curtain.
The article, which Hamilton wrote for Columbia Journalism Review, contains this wise observation:
...there isn’t much appetite for speculative stories about complicated issues in most newsrooms. Once the crisis occurs, once you can quote government officials referring to credit-derivative obligations and credit-default swaps as “toxic assets,” it gets easier.
The truth is, there isn't much appetite for these kinds of stories outside the newsroom either. It makes me think of the film "Jaws" and the difficulty Roy Scheider's character had convincing people to get out of the water before they saw the shark fin for themselves.

Also, speculation can be dangerous. Just ask Judy Miller. In hindsight, we often assume that the newspaper warnings would have pointed to the danger that came to pass - but speculation can just as often warn of false dangers, and in the process embolden bad decision-making.

(CJR vis LA Biz Observed)

Dec 30, 2008

Trading in our futures

Today is Day Two in the Washington Post's three-part series called "What Went Wrong?" about the smarty pants who combined their faith in capitalism, their faculty in mathematics and their facility with computers to fashion the highly complex and highly leveraged derivatives market that helped implode the global financial system.

The story begins in the late 1980s at AIG with the geek squad that formed its Financial Products division... We all know how it ends.

Dec 26, 2008

A buyer for IndyMac

Tis the season for fire sales, and Dune Capital Management has seized the moment to buy up the failed lender IndyMac Bancorp for an undisclosed amount. Dune Capital is run by a couple former Goldman Sachs partners, who might dip into TARP funds to seal the deal.

News of the sale comes from Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter via LA Biz Observed.

The Implode-O-Meter also links to this fun fact from Michael Hodges at Grandfather Economic Report:
America has become more a debt ' junkie'than ever before with total debt of $53 Trillion- and the highest debt ratio in history. That's $175,154 per man, woman and child - or $700,616 per family of 4, $33,781 more debt per family than last year.

Dec 22, 2008

Magical accounting at IndyMac

The Office of Thrift Supervision has "removed" a top banking regulator for allowing IndyMac Bancrop to use accounting gimmickry to cover up its financial frailty. The Washington Post reports:

A senior federal banking regulator has been removed from his job after government investigators concluded that he knowingly permitted IndyMac Bancorp to present a misleading picture of its financial health in a federal filing only months before the California thrift was seized by regulators.

The Office of Thrift Supervision removed Darrel Dochow as director of its western region, where he was responsible for regulating several of the largest banks that failed or were sold in the past year, including Washington Mutual, Countrywide Financial, IndyMac and Downey Savings and Loan.

-snip-

Dochow was appointed regional director in September 2007 after serving as the No. 2 in the western region. He was paid $230,000 in 2007, according to government records. Dochow got the job shortly after playing a leading role in persuading Countrywide to move under OTS supervision, a major coup for the agency, which is funded by fees from the companies it oversees.

In the late 1980s, Dochow had been the chief career supervisor of the savings-and-loan industry, and federal investigators later concluded he played a key role in the collapse of Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan by delaying and impeding proper oversight of that thrift's operations.

Gee, it's hard to imagine what went wrong...

At the time of IndyMac's failure, which has cost taxpayers $8.9 billion, the head of the OTS, John Reich, pinned the blame on Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-New York. Reich said Schumer scared investors with a letter raising questions about the bank's solvency. When asked about Dochow's role in the bank's collapse, Reich "described Dochow's actions as a 'relatively small factor in the events leading to the failure of IndyMac,'" according to the Post.

Dec 8, 2008

NYT bets the house

The credit crisis has slammed the newspaper business. Rumblings of bankruptcy at Tribune Co. and now the New York Times plans to borrow against its new building to ease a cash flow problem:
The New York Times Company plans to borrow up to $225 million against its mid-Manhattan headquarters building, to ease a potential cash flow squeeze as the company grapples with tighter credit and shrinking profits.

Nov 29, 2008

The bleakness of Black Friday

Peter Goodman of the New York Times offers a welcome exception the tired Black Friday retread.

Instead of counting shoppers and speculating about whether retailers are gonna make out like they hoped, he examines what transformed our annual frenzied ritual of consumption into something that on Friday killed a temp worker at Wal-Mart, an outcome that somehow seemed preordained in an economy addicted to bad habits and desperation.

Goodman writes:
It was a tragedy, yet it did not feel like an accident. All those people were there, lined up in the cold and darkness, because of sophisticated marketing forces that have produced this day now called Black Friday. They were engaging in early-morning shopping as contact sport. American business has long excelled at creating a sense of shortage amid abundance, an anxiety that one must act now or miss out.

-snip-

For decades, Americans have been effectively programmed to shop. China, Japan and other foreign powers have provided the wherewithal to purchase their goods by buying staggering quantities of American debt. Financial institutions have scattered credit card offers as if they were takeout menus and turned our houses into A.T.M.’s. Hollywood and Madison Avenue have excelled at persuading us that the holiday season is a time to spend lavishly or risk being found insufficiently appreciative of our loved ones.

-snip-

Wages for most Americans have fallen in real terms over the last eight years. Pensions have been turned into 401(k) plans that have just relinquished half their value to an angry market. Health benefits have been downgraded or eliminated altogether. Working hours are being slashed, and full-time workers are having to settle for jobs through temp agencies.

Indeed, this was the situation for the unfortunate man who found himself working at the Valley Stream Wal-Mart at 5 a.m. Friday, a temp at a company emblematic of low wages and weak benefits, earning his dollars by trying to police an unruly crowd worried about missing out.

In a sense, the American economy has become a kind of piƱata — lots of treats in there, but no guarantee that you will get any, making people prone to frenzy and sending some home bruised.

It seemed fitting then, in a tragic way, that the holiday season began with violence fueled by desperation; with a mob making a frantic reach for things they wanted badly, knowing they might go home empty-handed.

Nov 26, 2008

Didn't heed the messenger

Before September, mortgage backed securities and credit default swaps didn't sell newspapers. It was hard to cash in on a story about Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Big packages on the looming threat of a housing crisis took time, research and copious editing to get straight - and a relatively few people read the results. So few, in fact, that when the trouble finally hit, everyone seemed to forget the stories were ever written.

AJR took a look and found that, to a larget extent, the media did warn of the coming doom. But it wasn't the news most of us thought we could use:
Andrew Leckey, director of the Donald W. Reynolds National Center for Business Journalism at Arizona State University, compares the situation to an unwanted Christmas present wrapped in shiny paper and a bow: Nobody wants to open it up to see what's inside. The reading public wants to read only what it wants to believe. Brauchli agrees: "The notion that the business press wasn't paying attention is wrong, and the assertion that we were asleep at the switch is wrong. We were attentive. We were aggressive. We were aware. We wrote abundantly. But it is very hard to get the public's attention for stories warning of complex financial risks in the middle of a roaring, populist bull market."

Nov 25, 2008

Preservation*

The argument over whether to call hundreds of billions of dollars flowing out of government coffers and into private banks a "bailout package" or "rescue plan" seems short-sighted to me. Neither term does a sufficient job of capturing the consequences of what's being done, and both imply a positive outcome.

A better and more frightening term is "preservation plan." In trying to prevent a complete meltdown in the financial sector we are preserving a system that is not sustainable.

In some ways our response to the credit crisis reminds me of our decision to fight fires in once remote wilderness areas. Intervention becomes necessary because we have chosen to develop next to forestland. At the same time, intervention interrupts a natural process, making future fires burn hotter and more destructively. Logic says we should let the fires burn, but that means putting people's homes and lives at risk. Preserving homes and lives increases future risk and encourages more building next to forestland.

The risk of failure in resolving the short-term crisis seems to require that we ignore the long-term consequences. How does one undo a cycle of bad decision-making after the cycle has begun?

This financial crisis appears to be circling in the same vicious manner. Intervention becomes necessary because we have become dependent on consumer spending and rising home values to keep our economy moving, and avoid a massive recession, bank failures and job losses. Intervention means propping up a consumer economy that demands more and more injections of credit to survive, whether they come from the government or mortgages or credit cards. Logic says we should let the whole mess collapse on itself, but that puts people's homes and lives at risk. Preserving homes and lives increases future risk and encourages people to go on spending the way they had before.

After all, what will the solution look like but a return to what we now consider to be normal?

*UPDATE: Just how addicted are we to credit? Banks continue to hand out credit cards with limits that have no bearing in reality, despite a rising risk of defaults. An anonymous banker complains to the New York Times that until banks start checking to see if customers can afford to pay back their lines of credit, the cycle of failure will continue. Which means more fires to put out.

Oct 12, 2008

Slaves to the algorithm

Dip below the surface of the credit crisis and you'll find yourself immersed in a cloudy soup of strange financial instruments - credit default swaps, mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations.

Even the term "financial instrument" fails to do the job of explaining what's at the center of this crisis, especially when prefixed with words like exotic, esoteric or toxic. Clearly, though, what we have is an economy within an economy that creates value out of its ability to make a transaction rather than the production of any tangible thing.

But in what space do these instruments exist? How is their value calculated? Are they fact or fiction?

In today's NYT, Richard Dooling locates the derivative inside algorithms being processed by computers and asks, is our credit economy at the mercy of the machine?
Somehow the genius quants — the best and brightest geeks Wall Street firms could buy — fed $1 trillion in subprime mortgage debt into their supercomputers, added some derivatives, massaged the arrangements with computer algorithms and — poof! — created $62 trillion in imaginary wealth. It’s not much of a stretch to imagine that all of that imaginary wealth is locked up somewhere inside the computers, and that we humans, led by the silverback males of the financial world, Ben Bernanke and Henry Paulson, are frantically beseeching the monolith for answers. Or maybe we are lost in space, with Dave the astronaut pleading, “Open the bank vault doors, Hal.”
-snip-
When Treasury Secretary Paulson (looking very much like a frightened primate) came to Congress seeking an emergency loan, Senator Jon Tester of Montana, a Democrat still living on his family homestead, asked him: “I’m a dirt farmer. Why do we have one week to determine that $700 billion has to be appropriated or this country’s financial system goes down the pipes?”

“Well, sir,” Mr. Paulson could well have responded, “the computers have demanded it.”

Putting the rabbit back in the hat

Chris Bray writes about one of my favorite issues: the false economy of credit (two of my better posts here and here). In his criticism of the bailout plan, he pens a classic line: "[W]e're working frantically to prop up the dying fiction."

I agree with the line but am more sanguine about the bailout package. I don't know if it's the best deal we could get and I'm a little disturbed about the capitulations Paulson has reportedly made in the prelude to injecting capital directly into the arteries of struggling banks, but I don't think we can break our credit addiction cold turkey.

We'll have to demand the next White House, the next Congress and the next generation help deliver us from derivatives and start to face the fundamental weaknesses of our economy - namely, that we consume (often using credit) what others makes. Loosening the levers of credit is not a solution to the credit crisis, because the crisis isn't that we have too little credit.

On those capitulations, here's a troubling passage from today's NYT (h/t Media Nation):
Industry executives quickly told Mr. Paulson that they liked the idea, though they warned that the Treasury should not try to squeeze out existing shareholders. They also begged Mr. Paulson not to impose tough restrictions on executive pay and golden-parachute deals for executives who are fired.

Mr. Paulson heeded those pleas. In his remarks on Friday, he carefully noted that the government would acquire only “nonvoting” shares in companies. And officials said the law lets the Treasury write most of its own restrictions on executive pay, and those restrictions can be lenient if they are applied to a set of fairly healthy companies.

Oct 2, 2008

The subprime mortgage meltdown picture book

See Jane sell a bad mortgage. See Dick buy the bad mortgage and bundle it with other bad mortgages, creating a collateralized debt obligation he can sell to institutional investors. Sell, Dick, sell!

A picture book account of how the subprime mortgage mess tanked our economy. There's a few words, too. (Note: The link is to a Power Point file.)

Sep 30, 2008

This street is my street, this street is your street

Bipartisanship in America is the practice of taking complex problems and turning them into sound bites - preferably ones that create false divisions.

Take, for instance, the bailout package being contemplated by Congress. After rendering the debate of all the fat of thought and nuance, Republicans and Democrats came together to boil the problem down into a simple concept: Main Street versus Wall Street.

As regular Americans spit bile at the thought of rewarding Wall Street Fat Cats with a $700-billion check for robbing their own banks, the Wall Street fat cats are suffering a massive panic attack over Main Street's woeful misunderstanding of the dangers overleveraging and undercapitalization will have on an ever-tightening credit market.

The thing is Wall Street and Main Street are two sides of the same street. Regular Americans are watching the crisis unfold on flat-screen TVs purchased with credit cards, in homes purchased by mortgages, with cars in the driveway purchased by loans. Wall Street force-fed our credit addiction through easy terms meant to fluff up household bottom lines as the trickle down failed to create real wealth. In the process, WS got addicted to its own supply of magical derivative-based flimflam. Now we're all jonesing some liquid credit.

I can't say whether the bailout package that went down yesterday is the right answer. And I do subscribe to the old adage that the rich are different - they do have more money. Way, WAY more money. That has to change. But in the meantime, enough of this fake suburban populism. It only makes our politicians believe what they're saying.

Sep 19, 2008

My Pulitzer pick

Who could have foreseen the Doomsday Scenario now playing out as the federal government tries to rescue Wall Street? That elite, East Coast media, that's who.

Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times sounded the alarm back in February with a long, detailed piece describing the massive credit default swaps market that is now threatening to swallow Wall Street in a swamp of toxic debt. On Feb. 17 she wrote:
Few Americans have heard of credit default swaps, arcane financial instruments invented by Wall Street about a decade ago. But if the economy keeps slowing, credit default swaps, like subprime mortgages, may become a household term.

Credit default swaps form a large but obscure market that will be put to its first big test as a looming economic downturn strains companies’ finances. Like a homeowner’s policy that insures against a flood or fire, these instruments are intended to cover losses to banks and bondholders when companies fail to pay their debts.

The market for these securities is enormous. Since 2000, it has ballooned from $900 billion to more than $45.5 trillion — roughly twice the size of the entire United States stock market.

No one knows how troubled the credit swaps market is, because, like the now-distressed market for subprime mortgage securities, it is unregulated. But because swaps have proliferated so rapidly, experts say that a hiccup in this market could set off a chain reaction of losses at financial institutions, making it even harder for borrowers to get loans that grease economic activity.

Morgenson went on to report that American International Group (AIG) failed to properly value it's swaps, leading to a $3.6 billion loss. Look how that turned out.

Morgenson won a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 for her coverage of Wall Street. She deserves another.

In what I still think is my best "To The Point," Morgenson came on our show to talk about the effect of the housing crisis on the economy. John Cassidy of the New Yorker was also a guest. He talked about the volatility of the free market and the inevitability of these terrible bubbles when government takes a hands-off approach.